A multi-dimension taxonomy of insider threats in cloud computing by Alhanahnah, Mohannad J. et al.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Alhanahnah, Mohannad J., Jhumka, Arshad and Alouneh, Sahel. (2016) A multi-dimension 
taxonomy of insider threats in cloud computing. The Computer Journal. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/79068                      
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The 
Computer Journal following peer review. The version of record is available online at:  
Link to final published version : http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/bxw020  
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
A Multi-Dimension Taxonomy of
Insider Threats in Cloud Computing
Mohannad J. Alhanahnah1, Arshad Jhumka2 and Sahel
Alouneh3
1iTrust Center for Research in Cyber Security, Singapore University of Techology and Design,
Singapore
2Department of Computer Science, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
3School of Computer Engineering and Information Technology, German Jordanian
University, Amman, Jordan
Email: mohannad jamal@sutd.edu.sg
Security is considered a significant deficiency in cloud computing, and insider
threats problem exacerbate security concerns in the cloud. In addition to that,
cloud computing is very complex by itself, because it encompasses numerous
technologies and concepts. Apparently, overcoming these challenges requires
substantial efforts from information security researchers to develop powerful
mitigation solutions for this emerging problem. This entails developing a
taxonomy of insider threats in cloud environments encompassing all potential
abnormal activities in the cloud, and can be useful for conducting security
assessment. This paper describes the first phase of an ongoing research to develop
a framework for mitigating insider threats in cloud computing environments.
Primarily, it presents a multidimensional taxonomy of insider threats in cloud
computing, and demonstrates its viability. The taxonomy provides a fundamental
understanding for this complicated problem by identifying five dimensions, it also
supports security engineers in identifying hidden paths, thus determining proper
countermeasures, and presents a guidance covers all bounders of insiders threats
issue in clouds, hence it facilitates researchers’ endeavours in tackling this problem.
For instance, according to the hierarchical taxonomy, clearly many significant
issues exist in public cloud, while conventional insider mitigation solutions can be
used in private clouds. Finally, the taxonomy assists in identifying future research
directions in this emerging area.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The usage of cloud computing is rapidly growing;
however, security concern is the main obstacle to this
growth [1]. According to a recent survey conducted by
RightScale in 2015, [2] security was the first significant
cloud challenge, and the concern about this challenge
has increased, compared to the survey which was con-
ducted in the previous year. Moreover, according to the
INFOSEC Research Council [3], insider threats provide
some very hard challenges. In the cloud computing era,
this insider threat problem has started to affect this
area too. This observation is supported by the Cloud
Security Alliance reports [4,5],as they list insider threats
among the top threats to cloud computing.
Despite the increased awareness of internal threats
at both the enterprise level and in the cloud computing
infrastructure, little research work has been done in this
space for classifying and addressing this issue. Initially,
this was due to the absence of an agreement on the
definition of insiders and their taxonomies. Therefore,
there is a pressing need for developing relevant and
accurate taxonomies of insider threats to contribute
towards the understanding of this complex issue and
to help towards developing techniques to combat the
insider threat problems. Along this line of research,
Magklaras’ PhD thesis [6] developed a taxonomy of
insider threat while developing a language for detecting
and predicting insider attacks.
Developing attack taxonomies is the process of
classifying attacks in categories based on common
characteristics, i.e., identifying the common patterns
of different attacks. This provides a more granular
understanding about the “components” of each attack
and improves the discovery of hidden vulnerabilities
[7]. Thus, it was suggested at a RAND workshop
that the development of an insider threat taxonomy
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[8] would be important because this underpins the
understanding and building of models for tackling this
intricate problem. Therefore, at the next workshop,
taxonomies have been presented, based on different
factors (such as observables, insider actions and so
on [9]. The workshop described different taxonomies for
each factor and the workshop also made an additional
taxonomy by mapping insider actions taxonomy and
vulnerabilities and exploits. Attacks could be classified
based on several criteria such as the impact, cause or
fix [7]. Another dimension of classification considers
the target of the attack, e.g., attacks targeting financial
institutions, the location of the attack, e.g., external
attacks & internal attacks, or the scope of the attack.
Igure & Williams [7] described general properties and
guidelines for developing taxonomies, with the most
important among these being 1) that a hierarchical
taxonomy is better than linear classification to obtain
a firm understanding, 2) the taxonomy needs to target
specific applications, i.e., operating system attacks are
different than network or cryptographic attacks.
In fact, very few taxonomies of insider threats in the
cloud computing environment have been developed in
the literature, where the main intention of the existing
works was not mainly for developing a classification.
These existing taxonomies are thus limited to a specific
issue in the cloud and do not cover all aspects of
this emerging problem. These taxonomies are also
not hierarchical and do not follow the guidelines for
developing taxonomies. On the other hand, we propose
a multi-dimensional, hierarchical taxonomy that covers
fundamental aspects of insider threats in a cloud
computing environment to provide an overall insight
into the insider threat security problem. Further, as the
taxonomy being proposed focuses on high-level concepts
(rather than implementation details), multiple attacks
can be captured and be attributed to a given attack
class. In this way, the taxonomy becomes dynamic in
the sense that, when new insider attacks emerge, they
can be analyzed at a high level and be assessed on the
overall impact they have on the system. Specifically,
the taxonomy will allow attacks to be represented
using signatures and many attacks may carry the same
signature, meaning that they may be handled using
similar mechanisms.
The contributions of this work are a) identifying
the dimensions of the taxonomy. Section 3 introduces
this contribution and describes it in a formal way
b) converting the dimensions into the hierarchy form.
Section 4 maps the literature surveyed and the
taxonomy dimensions in order to present the taxonomy
in hierarchy structure c) presenting the viability of the
taxonomy d) describing future research directions in
this area. Section 5 describes in detail the last three
contributions.
2. TERMINOLOGY
In this section, we briefly explain the relevant concepts
of cloud computing and insider threats that underpin
the taxonomy that is developed in this paper.
Cloud computing is a distributed computing model
that comprises all the necessary computing resources to
store, manage and process data to deliver services [10].
Section 3 describes in detail the various types of cloud
deployment and cloud services. We consider a cloud
computing environment as one that provides for elastic
resource provisioning. This tremendously reduces
operational and administrative costs and potentially
saves time. Insider threats are attacks that are carried
out by individuals who possess the inside knowledge of
the system and they have the required permissions to
access the system [1], i.e., the attacks are carried out
by inside users or insiders.
Therefore, in this paper, we define insiders as those
trusted and authorized users who misuse the given per-
missions. Insiders are divided into two types: malicious
insiders and non-malicious insiders [11], the former
is an authorized user who intentionally misuses the
granted access. This in turn can cause a violation of
the confidentiality, integrity or availability properties of
the organization data or information systems [12, 13].
In a similar way, insiders pose the similar harm to
the cloud infrastructure, but the employed techniques
are different than the approaches utilized in traditional
environments. This has significant influences on the
types of countermeasures used to mitigate these threats.
Thus, the identification of different classes of insider
threats in cloud computing environments is imperative,
for building the fundamental knowledge about both the
vulnerabilities and their respective countermeasures.
Our taxonomy can cover both types of insider threats
(malicious and non-malicious) because the focus of this
work is on the properties of the attack, i.e., the impact
the attack has on the system. This can be represented
using the five dimensions that are proposed in the next
section.
3. DIMENSIONS OF THE TAXONOMY
At the first stage, we identify the properties which
should be provided by the taxonomy, and according
to these, the five dimensions have been selected. The
criteria are summarized as follows:
1. Reduction of the confusion and overlapping
between categories as much as possible.
2. Description of the fundamental concepts of insider
threats and cloud computing.
3. Maintainance of the elasticity, effectiveness and ex-
pandability features. Therefore, the taxonomy pro-
vides an abstract insight into insider threats in the
cloud and, at the same time, it can be adapted in
the future.
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FIGURE 1. Dimensions of the taxonomy
Additionally, we followed the guidelines for develop-
ing a taxonomy, presented in [7], which was previously
explained in Section 1. Accordingly, the paper identifies
five dimensions for building the taxonomy, as depicted
in Figure 1. The five dimensions identified are:
1. Cloud deployment,
2. Source of the attack,
3. Attack impact,
4. Insider attack approach, and
5. Susceptible cloud service.
We detail each dimension in the next coming few
sections.
3.1. Cloud deployment (D)
In general, there are three forms of cloud deployment,
namely public, private and community clouds. The
conjunction of those previous types of cloud systems
forms a hybrid cloud [10]. When the cloud is called pub-
lic, this means that services are handled over an open
public network. Therefore, in public cloud deployment,
the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) owns and controls the
resources and these resources are shared between Cloud
Service Consumers (CSC). Although the CSP hosts the
CSC’s data, this does not mean that the CSP become
the owner of the hosted data.
On the other hand, the cloud system is called a pri-
vate cloud system when all resources and infrastructure
are operated by a single organisation and the system
is dedicated to that single organization and within its
premises. However, from a security point of view, this
does not imply that a private cloud system is more se-
cure than a public cloud system. Rather, it means that
security threats to the public cloud system may not ap-
ply to private clouds.
Finally, a community cloud model is similar to the
public cloud model except for some differences, such as
the access, which is limited here to a specific commu-
nity of cloud members or users. Also, it is possible for a
community cloud to be owned by more than one com-
munity member or by a third party. In other words,
a cloud community deployment shares some non-cloud
resources between entities (third-parties), and therefore
there is no dedicated CSP which possesses cloud re-
sources. Figure 2 depicts the relation between the type
of cloud deployment and its threat exposure.
In our taxonomy only public, private and community
clouds are considered. Since hybrid cloud is a mixture
of the previous types, thus it inherits the security issues
of the other types of cloud deployments [14].
FIGURE 2. Security level based on cloud service and cloud
deployment
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3.2. Attack Source (S)
Cloud deployment significantly influences attack
sources. In general, in private clouds, insiders from
company itself, therefore the company employees con-
stitute the source of insider attacks. While in public
clouds, there are two sources of insider attacks, insiders
from the CSC side and insiders from the provider side,
particularly CSP employees. Also, insiders from CSC
party and insiders from third-parties are attack sources
in community cloud. Finally, world is a common at-
tack source between the types of cloud deployment, it
includes anyone managed to gain unauthorized access,
and impersonate as insider. Hence, Duncan et al. [13]
consider advanced persistent threats (APT) as a poten-
tial source of insider threats, though APTs are initiated
by external attackers, because at some phases the APT
acts as authorized user for making a damage or per-
forming data exfiltration [15].
3.3. Attack Behavior (B)
CERT at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) categories
insider threats based on the behaviour of the insider
attack [12]. Three out of four categories will be
considered for the taxonomy purposes: Intellectual
Property (IP) theft, Fraud and IT sabotage. Whereas
CERT called the fourth category espionage. While
in another report, CERT describes a new category
(miscellaneous), which includes behavioral patterns
that do not fall in the other three types. They also keep
the aforementioned three categories, and link espionage
to IT sabotage [16]. In fact, the difference between es-
pionage and IT sabotage has been investigated in [17],
and the result was that there is no distinction be-
tween espionage and IT sabotage, even same or sim-
liar countermeasures can be used for mitigating both
categories. Furthermore, espionage can be considered
as a motivation for committing insider attacks [18].
Also, by referring back to the repercussions of Hanssens
espionage incident which was the disclosure of secret
information to former Soviet Union [19]. Hence, espi-
onage is considered as IT sabotage in our taxonomy.
Other names of IP theft attack are data exfiltration or
data leakage [20, 21]. In essence, these three categories
of insider attacks are generic, and encompass many
attacks, for instance, insider might carry out identity
theft before committing financial fraud attacks.
3.4. Impact (I)
An attack can have several consequences on a system. A
malware such as a cryptovirus may affect the integrity of
the system as well as making part of it unavailable. In ef-
fect, several attacks will have several impacts on the sys-
tem, i.e., they will cause violation of different security
properties. When considered in this fashion, several at-
tacks may end up being deemed “similar”. To avoid such
cases, we focus on the direct impact of insider threats on
systems, i.e., the first observable impact is the security
properties. According to Silowash et al. [16], fraud is
any unauthorized manipulation, deletion or addition of
data, where fraud attacks break data integrity. Also,
they define IT sabotage as the usage of IT to establish
and direct a harm, which in the first place affects, the
availability. While the immediate consequence of IP
theft attack is the breaching of confidentiality, because
the forefront action of this attack is a disclosure of infor-
mation. It might be that these attacks can have other
consequences, but the reason for focusing on the first
or direct impact is practicing the early containment of
attacks, in order to avoid and alleviate additional dam-
aging consequences, which is an ultimate goal. In fact,
this can encourage researchers and security engineers to
capture initial abnormal implications for mitigating the
attacks at early stages.
3.5. Cloud service (Cs)
Ordinarily, the main cloud services are: Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and
Software as a Service (SaaS). Each service has its own
security concerns, for instance usually end users use
SaaS applications (i.e. Gmail), which is developed
through PaaS APIs (i.e. Google App Engine), which
are hosted on IaaS. Figure 2 depicts the relation
between a cloud service and the level of security control.
Through this dimension we can build some elicitations,
speculate which kind of applications are dealing with,
and determine the level of control possessed by the
insider. IaaS specifies the configuration of storage,
hypervisors and Virtual Machines (VMs), whereas PaaS
is used for developing different applications using the
provided API, but SaaS utilizes cloud applications. We
noticed that performing insider attacks at the IaaS and
PaaS levels require high skilled insiders. As explained
later, the demonistrated attack in [22] requires profes-
sional skills
3.6. Formalizing the taxonomy
We propose the following formalization for representing
our taxonomy, this opens the horizon for future uti-
lization and development of our taxonomy. Also this
formalization assisted us for making a comparision be-
tween our taxonomy and the taxonomies presented in
the literature.
The taxonomy and its five dimensions can be
formalized using the approach:
Taxonomy T is described by T= <D, S, I, B, Cs>
where:
• Cloud deployment (D) ∈ {public, private, commu-
nity}
• Source of the attack (S) ∈ {CSC, CSP, third-party,
world}
• Impact of the attack (I) ∈ {availability, integrity,
confidentiality}
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• Insider attack behavior (B) ∈ {IP theft, fraud, IT
sabotage}
• Cloud Service (Cs) ∈ {SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, any}
For example T1 = <public, CSC, availability, IT
sabotage, IaaS>, this taxonomy describes an insider
attack in public cloud, originated from the data CSC
side, affects the availability, and performed from IaaS
environment. This formalization method will be used
in subsection 5.3 for showing that the taxonomies
developed in the literature can fit in our taxonomy.
4. HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF THE
TAXONOMY
According to the proposed five dimensions, and the
literature surveyed, Figure 3 crystallizes the taxonomy
in a hierarchal based. The five dimensions have been
utilized for building the taxonomy hierarchy as follows:
(1) cloud deployment (2) source of the insider attack
(3) attack impact (4) insider attack behaviour (5)
cloud service. Such hierarchy provides the fundamental
criteria, and shows the relation between them. While
the last layer provides examples of insider attacks
according to the upper layers.
The first layer of this taxonomy relies on the Cloud
Deployment. Accordingly, this layer provides general
directions, for example in Community cloud, it is
expected that several entities (third-parties) share the
cloud resources, and highly probable these entities are
implementing federation techniques for authenticating
users of each entity. But in private clouds, all resources
are owned by the company itself, and the CSC holds
a full control over its data. While in public clouds, all
resources are owned by the CSP, but these resources are
shared between CSCs; but, in this case there is no need
to implement federation techniques. Hence, security
concerns are varies according to the cloud deployment.
The second layer divides the attacks based on the
source of the attack. There are several sources of attack
in cloud environments especially public and community
clouds, for example insiders can be from the CSC side
or the CSP in public clouds. But users from member
companies in the community cloud can pose potential
insider threats. While insiders in private clouds are
in general under the control of the organizations, thus
potential insider threats can be treated as standard
insider attacks. This layer specifies sources of insider
attacks.
According to the impact of the attack, insider threats
have been classified in the third layer. Indeed, each
attacks could have many consequences. As shown in
Figure 3, insider attacks from the CSP side affect
the confidentiality and availability. This directs the
CSP organization about the mitigation techniques
which are required to be implemented. On the
other hand, the CSC should seriously seek integrity
protection solutions, in addition to the implementation
of confidentiality and availability solutions. This layer
has a reflection on the fourth layer, which specifies
categories of insider attacks that violate the security
triangle.
In the light of the previous layer, the fourth layer
utilizes CMU’s classification of insider threats (IP theft,
Fraud, and IT sabotage). Subsection 3.3 mentions the
immediate impact of the CMU insider threat categories.
Therefore, CSP employees do not pose fraud attacks,
but they can carry out data exfiltration and IT sabotage
attacks. Where authorized users in private cloud can
commit all three types of insider threats. Furthermore,
this layer and next layers unveil the dearth of research in
this field, including lack in the availability of substantial
volume of documented insider incidents, especially in
public and community clouds (private cloud insider
attacks considered as standard insider attacks but with
the utilization of different means).
The fifth layer narrows down to specify the type of
cloud service. In fact, according to the collected insider
threat incidents, which are presented in Section 5.1, we
think the cloud service does not have significant in-
fluences on insider threats in private and community
clouds, as long as the insider possesses the access cre-
dentials and can perform the attack regardless of the
type of cloud deployment. Since resources (asset and
data) are owned only by the organization in a private
cloud, thus the insider can perform the attack at IaaS,
PaaS or SaaS. While in the community cloud, resources
are shared between the parties. Also in public cloud,
each cloud service specifies the control level of the CSC,
where the CSP possesses the ultimate control. There-
fore, the cloud deployment could influence the attacks
that the insider can perform.
Though both CSP side and CSC side pose IP theft
attack, but the cloud service influences the strategy
which will be used by each party for performing this
attack. For example, since the CSP hosts the cloud
service (regardless its of type, because all types rely
on IaaS), hence it has higher control compare to the
CSC, so CSP insiders can attack hypervisors, network
or storage devices, even they have physical access, but
CSC’s insiders have limited control and cannot easily
attack these assets.
Accordingly, as stated at the end of Figure 3, below
the taxonomy, that traditional mitigation solutions (e.g.
monitoring) for insider attacks in public and community
clouds are insufficient, and should be adopted based
on the previously described circumstances. As will be
described later in the future work section. Where in
private cloud computing some conventional mitigation
techniques can be utilized (e.g. audit).
In general, customers of IaaS cloud have superior
control than PaaS and SaaS, and the same rule
implies between PaaS and SaaS, so as we move to the
application level, the customers control is diminished
as depicted in Figure 2. Similarly, the achieved security
in private cloud is greater than community and public,
in other words, as we move towards publicity, threat
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FIGURE 3. Hierarchical taxonomy
exposure is increased [10].
Noticeably, PaaS services are susceptible for the three
types of insider attacks, because it is an intermediated
layer between IaaS and SaaS, however, this does not
mean the techniques that are used to carry out IP
theft attacks in SaaS are the same as in PaaS, also
as emphasized earlier, this does not imply same attack
can be committed by the insiders from each party.
In other words, IP theft attacks from PaaS CSC
are different than IP theft attacks from PaaS CSP.
According to the hierarchy, IP theft attacks are common
between all cloud services, with the consideration of
various approaches are taken in each cloud service,
for example as for leaking information in IaaS, the
insider may target the hypervisor or storage, while in
PaaS, the application itself will be targeted, and in
SaaS, simply download actions, or spoofing techniques
may be utilized. This could explain why majority of
the surveyed publications are confined in proposing
solutions against IP theft attacks/data leakage as
described in the next section.
5. CASE STUDY AND VIABILITY OF THE
TAXONOMY
In a nutshell, this section shows evident insider threat
examples (the last layer of the taxonomy), which
distinguishes the difference in the layers of the proposed
taxonomy.
5.1. Demonstrated insider attacks in the cloud
This subsection shows the conformity of the proposed
taxonomy with the insider attacks demonstrated in the
literature. Consequently, this substantiates the mean-
ingful results of developing taxonomy of insider attacks.
Table 1 summarizes the attacks. Rocha & Correia
[22] demonstrate four insider attacks in IaaS for
accessing users data, hence the ability to leak
confidential and IP data. Likewise, three malicious
insider attacks in IaaS have been demonstrated for
proofing the ability of the malicious insider accessing
and extracting users data [23]. Also, Duncan et al.
[13] present several examples, where the administrator
can employ forensic techniques for extracting sensitive
information (i.e. usernames, passwords) from a VM on
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FIGURE 4. Distribution of the incidents based on cloud
service
the CSP side in IaaS.
Moreover, in IaaS, especially public cloud, since cloud
resources are shared between CSCs, there is a possibility
for a conflict of interest, which leads to information
disclosure [24]. Wei et. al. [25] present cloud app
store scenarios of customers who plant Malware on
their VMs before publishing them. In cloud app store
environments there are three entities: one CSP entity
and two CSCs entities (Publisher and Retriever). In
fact, this behaviour has negative implications on the
confidentiality and integrity of the information hosted
on the VM. Since the infected VM could be shared with
other customers, or could be employed for infecting the
VMs located in the same network. Therefore, two enti-
ties are affected by this case, the CSP and the retriever
customer. Other attacks also can be performed by one
customer against other customers’ VMs [26]. Initially,
the malicious customer performs reconnaissance check
for verifying the existence of his VM and the victim’s
VM on the same physical machine. Subsequently, the
malicious CSC can extract cryptographic keys or per-
form DoS attacks against other CSCs [26].
Furthermore, mitigation techniques for fraud attacks
have been described in SaaS private clouds, in addition
to unauthorized access activities [28]. In the surveyed
literature, we have not found insider attacks that
have been shown in PaaS, but this does not mean
PaaS is immune against insider threats. For example
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) allows researchers
and companies recruiting people for performing some
tasks[29]. This valuable PaaS cloud service might
be utilized maliciously for committing insider attacks
are in layer three of the taxonomy, especially when
workers are requested to perform external hits, this
example can be considered as a potential insider attack
in PaaS. Figure 4 and Figure 5 summarizes using pie
diagram the distribution of the insider threat incidents
demonstrated in the literature based on cloud service
and insider attack behaviour respectively.
FIGURE 5. Distribution of the incidents based on insider
attack behaviour
5.2. How to use the taxonomy
The taxonomy can be utilized for defining the
appropriate approach for mitigating insider attacks.
In other words, similar approaches can be used
for mitigating insider attacks that share the same
dimensions (the attacks that have the same signature).
For instance, according to the proposed taxonomy, IT
sabotage and espionage are considered the same attack,
therefore, similar approaches can be used for mitigating
these attacks. This has been shown in [17], which recom-
mends performing security audit, since insiders in both
attacks have gone beyond the need to know principle.
Moreover, Malicious Hypervisor attack described in [13]
and virtual machine relocation attack presented in [22]
share the same signature <public, CSP, Confiden-
tiality, IP Theft, IaaS>, thus a mitigation solution
can be implemented at the hypervisor level (e.g. access
control or Provenance Tracking [25]).
On the other hand, as presented in Table 1, though
the same attack presented in [25], but it has different
signatures, due to the diversity of its consequences. The
first signature is <public, CSC, Confidentiality, IP
Theft, IaaS>, while the second signature is <public,
CSC, Integrity, Fraud, IaaS>. Accordingly, differ-
ent mitigation solutions are required to be implemented.
The taxonomy has the ability to capture this variation,
because it has been designed based on multidimensional
approach.
Also as we are heading downwards in the taxonomy,
we are eliminating and specifying the factors and techni-
cal aspects which should be ignored or considered while
developing the mitigation solution, and conducting se-
curity assessment. This increases the effectiveness of
the proposed taxonomies. For example, if the insider
attack violates the integrity in IaaS environments, then
the company should think about integrity solutions on
the storage level for example, while if the violation was
in PaaS platform, then the company should deploy in-
tegrity preserving solutions at the application level in-
stead of the storage level. Also, the CSC in public cloud
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TABLE 1. Summary of demonstrated insider attacks in the cloud, and their compliance with the proposed taxonomy
Reference Attack/vulnerability
Compliance with the developed taxonomy
Layer1 Layer2 Layer3 Layer4 Layer5
[22]
Clear text passwords in memory snapshots Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
Obtaining private keys using memory snapshots Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
Extracting confidential data from the hard disk Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
Virtual machine relocation Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
[23]
Memory Dump Scanning Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
Public Templates Poisoning Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
Snapshot Cracking Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
[24] Conflict-of-interest Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
[13]
IaaS Virtual Machine Cloning Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
DaaS File Copy Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
Malicious Hypervisor Public CSP Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
Denial Of Service (DOS) Public CSP Availability IT sabotage IaaS
[25]
Planting Malware on the VM Public CSC Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
Planting Malware on the VM Public CSC Integrity Fraud IaaS
[26]
Cache-based side channels Public CSC Confidentiality IP theft IaaS
Denial Of Service (DOS) Public CSC Availability IT sabotage IaaS
TABLE 2. Summary of exist taxonomies in the literature
Reference
Dimension taxonomy
Cloud deployment Source Attack Behavior Impact Cloud service
[1] {public} {CSP,CSC} φ φ φ
[13] φ {world, third− party, CSP,CSC} φ φ φ
[27] {public} {CSP,CSC} φ φ φ
can not deploy any solution if the attack from the CSP
side, as the CSC has no control over the CSP infras-
tructure. Hence, the taxonomy works as a road map for
specifying the ability to adopt or reuse existing solu-
tions. This facilitates the security engineers mission in
implementing the appropriate mitigation approaches.
Another flexibility feature of this taxonomy is the
ability for further classification after layer number
five, additionally it provides a powerful guidance for
combining similar attack under one umbrella and
foreseeing potential internal threats. Furthermore, this
taxonomy can be integrated with threats modeling
frameworks such STRIDE[30], because the listed
insider attacks in the fourth layer fall under the
STRIDE categories, namely Spoofing, Tampering, and
Information Disclosure.
As exemplified in Table 1, the vast majority of
demonstrated insider attacks can be expressed using
the proposed formula t= <public, CSP, confidentiality,
IP theft, IaaS>. This could be due to the high
potential for performing IP theft attacks from the
CSP side, especially by the administrators (they have
massive level of control), and the lower complexity in
comparison with IT sabotage and fraud attacks.
5.3. Locating related works in the Taxonomy
As intimated earlier, information about insider threats
in cloud computing is not widely available. Therefore,
the endeavours developing taxonomies in this area are
limited. Table 2 summarizes the taxonomy available in
the literature, and places them on our taxonomy.
5.4. Future Research Directions
This subsection is aiming to highlight research trends
in this area, and identify major techniques can support
sorting out this issue. We will employ the dimensions
and hierarchical structure of the taxonomy for achieving
this goal.
• Access Control: this topic is broadly discussed
in the literature, but there are many limitations
when it comes to mitigating insider attacks.
Crampton & Huth [31] discuss the limitation of
detecting insiders using access control techniques,
they emphasised the insufficiency of relying only
on static access and predefined access rules,
and they show the press need for considering
the context in the access rules. Also we
recommend investigating dynamic access control
approaches such as Attribute-Base Access Control
(ABAC), Risk based adaptive access control [32],
and Trust based access control [33]. However,
these approaches need be adopted for cloud
environments.
• Trust: many works consider trust as one of the
significant issues to the cloud [34–36]. Also, as
mentioned in the previous point employing trust
in access control can assist in mitigating insider
attacks. Therefore, according to the presented
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taxonomy, we proposed to trust paradigms for
public clouds. Firstly, developing mechanisms for
evaluating the trust level of CSP administrators,
this approach assists the CSP in detecting
malicious administrators. Secondly, consider the
CSP or CSC as insiders, because each party
constitutes a potential threat to the other party.
6. LIMITATIONS IN THE STATE-OF-THE-
ART
This section does not aim to comment on the value
of these researches, because developing a taxonomy
was not their main concern. Claycomb & Nicoll [1]
describe three categories of insider threats in the cloud
based on insider type, namely the rogue cloud provider
administrator, the employee in the victim organization
that exploits cloud weaknesses for unauthorized access,
and the insider who uses cloud resources to carry out
attacks against the companys local IT infrastructure.
Then, only under the rouge administrator, four types of
administrators (system, application, virtual image and
hosting company administrator) have been allocated
with their associated potential attacks. Majority of
these administrator categories fall under the CSP, but
for instance application administrators are common
between CSP and the CSC, therefore, this taxonomy
covers also public cloud. The taxonomy can be
formalized t1= <public, {CSP, CSC}, φ, φ, φ>.
Though the proposed categories pose the highest risk
due to the high privilege the administrators possess, but
these categories do not manifest all aspects of insider
attacks against the cloud, they are not on a multi-
dimension form and only based on the insider type.
Duncan et al. [13] built a holistic view of insiders
in the cloud ecosystem. This holistic view describes
insider attacks from insider location/source and data
location. Indeed, sources of the insider attacks have
been discussed in detail, namely, APT, familial insiders,
benign insider coercion, client side, ISP and third-
parties. All these sources come under the defined set
of attack sources world, third-party, CSP, CSC. But
the location of data which either in motion or at rest
was discussed briefly. The taxonomy can be expressed
t2=<φ, {world, third-party, CSP, CSC}, φ, φ, φ>.
However, the classification is not systematic, does not
provide an insight and clear perception and is linear not
on multidimensional base.
Kandias et al. [24] describe two categories of insider
threat, malicious insider activities either on the CSP
side or the outsourcer side. Indeed, this classification
can fit only for public cloud, does not consider technical
aspects and concerns in each types of cloud deployment
and services; hence this approach does not break down
the intricacies of insider threats in cloud environments.
On the other hand, classification based on the attack
source is implicitly considered in the first layer of the
proposed taxonomy, and explicitly defined in the second
layer, therefore it is expressed t3=<public, {CSP,
CSC}, φ, φ, φ>.
The benefits have been shown in this section about
our taxonomy, but also the taxonomy can be used
as a tool for framing future research and placing
current research. Therefore, researchers can use it for
identifying potential aspects that will be considered in
their work.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a novel taxonomy of insider
threats for the cloud computing environment. The im-
portance of such a taxonomy was recognised way back
to 2000 by RAND. Indeed, developing the taxonomy
was a strenuous mission, because of the scarcity of re-
ported insider threat incidents, especially in community
clouds. This work has been significantly influenced by
the availability of research in this area, where the taxon-
omy evinces major shortcomings in the literature about
insider threats in cloud environments. Hence, further
work can be conducted in this research area. The con-
tributions provided in this paper are:
• According to the taxonomy hierarchy, there are no
fraud attacks in public cloud from CSP insiders.
Thus, it is highly recommended to investigate this
issue.
• In public clouds, the cloud service does not
have impact while specifying potential mitigation
solutions, because the data are physically stored on
the CSP site regardless the type of the subscribed
cloud service.
• The taxonomy shows its applicability to classify
real world and the demonstrated insider attacks
against the cloud. In tandem, we demonstrate
the taxonomy ability to frame existing research.
Hence, we argue that this taxonomy provides a
better understanding of all aspects about insider
threats in cloud computing, this underpinning
ongoing research for addressing this problem.
• Researchers can use the taxonomy as a framework
for identifying all attributes that will be considered
in their work.
• The taxonomy can be utilized for conducting
security assessment, and discover hidden areas.
A potential future work is to expand the dimension
of the taxonomy, with more attention to community
clouds. Also, the development of an application to in-
clude all possible types of insider threats in a cloud
computing environment will definitely offer a big con-
tribution towards risk management, security assessment
and modelling of insider threats (i.e. developing attack
patters as presented in [37]). Furthermore, we will also
perform additional experiments for further validation of
the taxonomy. Another major area for further investi-
gation is the potential deployment of the taxonomy for
actual risk assessment of cloud systems. Given that the
The Computer Journal, Vol. ??, No. ??, ????
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taxonomy does not focus on detailed system implemen-
tations or specific nature of attacks (rather it focuses at
an abstract level), it offers support for such risk assess-
ment analysis.
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